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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
impaired their rights existing under the contract at the time of execu-
tion thereof that to hold it applicable would clearly be a violation of
the Constitution. 9 The remedy, to be applied retroactively, must be
substantial substitution for the rights acquired by each party at the
time the obligations are incurred.
E. R. D.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT-LIMITING EMPLOYER'S
FREEDOM OF SPEECHI-BOARD'S CONFORMITY TO JUDICIAL STAND-
ARDS.-Empoyees found written notices in their pay envelopes stating
that as the plant was always going to operate as an "open shop" they
need not join a union, and that the defendant company would deal indi-
vidually with any employees so desiring.' Relations between defen-
dant and employees became strained, and a strike ensued. A com-
pany union was fostered by the defendant who signed a contract with
it.2 Findings of fact made by a trial examiner were reversed by the
National Labor Relations Board. The Board found the company
guilty of unfair labor practices and ordered it to rehire the strikers,
to cease giving effect to the contract with the company-dominated
union and to post proper notices which would proclaim that defendant
had violated the law. The entire order was affirmed in the Circuit
Court of Appeals.3 On appeal, held, certiorari denied. N. L. R. B.
v. Elkland Leather Co., Inc., - U. S. -, 61 Sup. Ct. 170 (1940).
The defendant contended that the constitutional guaranty of
free speech protected its "open shop" statement and, if the National
Labor Relations Act sought to embrace that writing as an unfair labor
practice, 4 the Act was unconstitutional as contrary to the First
Amendment.5 The right of free speech is a qualified, not an absolute
right.6 Employees have a right to organize and to bargain collec-
9 Barnitz v. Beverly, 163 U. S. 118, 16 Sup. Ct. 1042 (1896).
1 "You are under no obligation to join any union and cannot be forced to
do so as this tannery will always operate as an open shop. This company will
deal individually with any employee that wishes to do so at any time."
2 Elkland Leather Workers Association, Inc.
3 114 F. (2d) 221 (C. C. A. 3d, 1940).
4 49 STAT. 452, 29 U. S. C. A. § 158 (1935) (It shall be unfair labor practice
for an employer (1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in section seven...). 49 STAT. 452, 29 U. S.
C. A. § 157 (1935) ("Employees shall have the right to self-organization, . . . to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage
in concerted activities, for the purpose of collective bargaining. ... ").
5 U. S. CONsT. AmEND. I ("Congress shall make no law abridging freedom
of speech .... ).
6 Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U. S. 281, 17 Sup. Ct. 326 (1897); United
States v. Toledo Newspaper Co., 247 U. S. 402, 38 Sup. Ct. 560 (1918);
Frowerke v. United States, 249 U. S. 204, 39 Sup. Ct. 249 (1919).
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tively with their employer,7 and these rights would be wholly ineffec-
tive if the employer, under the pretext of using his constitutional
guaranty of free speech, were able to coerce employees and thus inter-
fere with the rights guaranteed to them by the Act.8 General expres-
sions of opinion by the employer, however, have been held not to
hinder union growth.9 Congress did not intend -to limit such general
statements by the employer, because that would violate the First
Amendment. 10 The rule is different where threats are made by the
employer to prevent union organization; such threats constitute an
unfair labor practice and are not entitled to the protection of the First
Amendment." This sort of threat, written or parol, comes within
the prohibition of the Act when made by employer, 12 his supervisory
employees 1 3 and probably by third persons. 14
The company objected to the Board's order requiring the com-
pany to post notices. Any notice can be ordered by the Board,
which aids in giving the employees a freedom in choosing their affilia-
tions and an unhampered right to collectively adjust their relations
with the employer. 1' To further accomplish these purposes, dis-
establishment of employer-dominated unions may also be necessary,
and orders of the Board to such effect have been held to be proper.16
The findings of fact made by the Board do not have to conform
7 See note 4, supra.8 N. L. K. B. v. Rockford Mitten & Hosiery Co., 16 N. L. R. B. 53 (1939).
9 Union Pacific Stages, Inc. v. N. L. R. B., 99 F. (2d) 153 (C. C. A. 9th,
1938); N. L. R. B. v. Express Publishing Co., 111 F. (2d) 588 (C. C. A. 5th,
1940) (employer merely said, "Membership in a labor organization will not
guaranty an employee employment").
10 See note 5, supra.
12 N. L. R. B. v. Remington Rand, Inc., 304 U. S. 576, 58 Sup. Ct. 1046
1938) ; N. L. R. B. v. Good Coal Co., 310 U. S. 630, 60 Sup. Ct. 978 (1940) ;
N. L. R. B. v. Biles Lumber Co., 98 F. (2d) 18 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938); N. L. R. B.
v. Cowell Portland Cement Co., 108 F. (2d) 198 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939).
12N. L. R. B. v. Remington Rand, Inc., 304 U. S. 576, 58 Sup. Ct 1046
(1938); N. L. R. B. v. Titan Metal Mfg. Co., 308 U. S. 615, 60 Sup. Ct. 260
(1939); N. L. R. B. v. Union Drawn & Republic Steel, 109 F. (2d) 587 (C. C.
A. 3d, 1940).
13 N. L. R. B. v. Oregon Worsted Co., 96 F. (2d) 193 (C. C. A. 9th,
(1938); N. L. R. B. v. Mexico Textile Mills, 110 F. (2d) 565 (C. C. A. 5th,
1940); N. L. R. B. v. Hartsell Mills Co., 111 F. (2d) 291 (C. C. A. 4th, 1940).
14 N. L. R. B. v. Brown Shoe Co., Inc., 1 N. L. R. B. 803 (1936); see
N. L. R. B. v. Elkland Leather Co., 114 F. (2d) 221, 223 (C. C. A. 3d, 1940) ;
3 N. L. R. B. REP. (1938) 59-60 (the anti-union statements issue from business
people of the town economically dependent upon the employer).
Is N. L. R. B. v. Falk Corp., 308 U. S. 453, 60 Sup. Ct. 569 (1940);
National Licorice Co. v. N. L. R. B., 309 U. S. 350, 60 Sup. Ct. 569 (1940);
Republic Steel v. N. L. R. B., 311 U. S. 7, 61 Sup. Ct. 77 (1940); N. L. R. B.
v. Union Drawn & Republic Steel, 109 F. (2d) 587 (C. C. A. 3d, 1940).
16 N. L. R. B. v. Titan Metal Mfg. Co., 308 U. S. 615, 60 Sup. Ct. 260
(1939) ; N. L. R. B. v. Newport News Shipbuilding Co., 308 U. S. 241, 60 Sup.
Ct. 203 (1940); Republic Steel v. N. L. R. B., 311 U. S. 7, 61 Sup. Ct. 77(1940); N. L. R. B. v. Union Drawn & Republic Steel, 109 F. (2d) 29 (C. C.
A. 3d, 1940).
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strictly to judicial standards, 17 but have to substantially comply with
the evidence. 18 The findings must be stated by the Board itself,' 9
and it may not delegate this duty to a trial examiner. 20 Though it
may treat his findings as a recommendation, 21 the Board may reverse
them when no exceptions are taken.22
B.F.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT-UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE-
REFUSAL TO SIGN WRITTEN AGREEMENT AS A REFUSAL TO BARGAIN
COLLEcTIvELY.-In the campaign preceding an election by petitioner's
employees of an organization to represent them in collective bargain-
ing, petitioner's supervising employees participated in behalf of the
Heinz Employees Associatiofi, a plant organization. Their activities
ranged from disparaging remarks about the outside union to threats of
discharge, if the union were recognized. Following a complaint by a
representative of the union, petitioner instructed the supervising em-
ployees to refrain from interfering in the campaign, and they did.
However, petitioner failed to notify its employees that it repudiated
the participation of its supervising employees in the organization of the
association, and so had not removed the belief of the employees that
petitioner would favor those joining the association, or that support of
the union would result in reprisals. Since the election, in which the
union was designated by a majority as their bargaining representative,
petitioner has consistently recognized and bargained with the union.
Although petitioner has reached an agreement with the union concern-
ing wages, hours and working conditions of the employees, it has
refused to sign any contract embodying the terms of the agreement.
After a complaint by the union, the National Labor Relations Board
directed petitioner to cease the unfair labor practices in which peti-
tioner had engaged in connection with the association, to disestablish
the association, to recognize and bargain collectively with the union,
and to sign a written contract embodying any agreement which .peti-
tioner might reach respecting wages, hours and working conditions of
petitioner's employees. On certiorari to review a judgment' of the
27 International Ass'n of Mach. v. N. L. R. B., 110 F. (2d) 587 (App. D. C.
1939).
Is N. L. R. B. v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U. S. 332, 59 Sup. Ct. 508 (1939);
N. L. R. B. v. Oregon Worsted Co., 94 F. (2d) 671 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938);
International Ass'n of Mach. v. N. L. R. B., 110 F. (2d) 587 (App. D. C.
1939).
19 49 STAT. 453, 29 U. S. C. A. § 160(c) (1935).2 0 N . L. R. B. v. Elkland Leather Co., Inc., 114 F. (2d) 221 (C. C. A. 3d,
1940).2  N. L. R. B. v. Oregon Worsted Co., 94 F. (2d) 671 (C. C. A. 9th,
1938).
22 See note 21, supra.
2 110 F. (2d) 843 (C. C. A. 6th, 1940).
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